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ABSTRACT	  On	  April	  2010,	  recently	  after	  the	  eruption	  of	  the	  Greek	  crisis,	  an	  unexpected	  
hand	  from	  Turkey	  reached	  to	  Greece.	  Proud	  with	  his	  country’s	   last-­‐decade	  growth	  figures,	  
Turkey’s	  then	  Vice	  Prime	  Minister,	  Ali	  Babacan,	  paid	  a	  visit	   to	  Greece	   in	  order	  to	  share	  his	  
country’s	  reform	  period	  after	  its	  2000/1	  crisis,	  arguing	  that	  it	  could	  also	  be	  a	  case	  study	  for	  
Greece.	  In	  this	  brief,	  I	  analyzed	  Greek	  and	  Turkish	  financial	  crises.	  Although	  it	  is	  a	  mere	  fact	  
that	   the	   structural	   problems	   in	   Greek	   economy	   complicate	   the	   reform	   period	   in	   Greece,	  
there	   are	   certain	   lessons	   that	  Greeks	   can	   learn	   from	   the	   Turkish	   experience.	  As	   Turks	   did	  
after	  2001,	  they	  should	  see	  the	  crisis	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  overcome	  the	  long	  time	  problems.	  
In	  this	  regard,	  Greeks	  -­‐	   first	  and	  foremost	  -­‐	  should	  establish	  consensus	  among	  themselves,	  
signaling	  to	  the	  markets	  that	  they	  are	  ready	  to	  face	  the	  burdens	  of	  the	  reform	  period.	  
	  
Introduction	  
As	   the	   previous	   experiences	   would	  
suggest	  and	  the	  logics	  of	  economics	  would	  
confirm;	  current	  account	  deficits	  –	  sooner	  
or	  later	  –	  lead	  to	  financial	  crises.	  A	  sudden	  
confidence	   loss	   among	   the	   investors,	  
which	   might	   be	   triggered	   by	   various	  
factors,	   results	   with	   the	   credit	   crunches	  
for	   the	   national	   economies	   that	   have	  
already	   been	   addicted	   to	   operate	   under	  
the	   persistent	   financial	   inflows.	   Greece	  
and	   Turkey,	   during	   the	   last	   decade,	  were	  
no	  exceptions	  in	  these	  regards:	  
First	   Turkey	   has	   been	   hit	   by	   a	   financial	  
turmoil	   in	   November	   2000.	   With	   the	  
collapse	   of	   a	   medium	   sized	   private	   bank	  
and	   the	   confidence	   loss	   among	   investors	  
as	   a	   result,	   average	   interest	   rates	  
increased	   by	   four	   times	   in	   the	   period	   of	  
one	   month.	   Just	   three	   months	   later,	   on	  
February	   19,	   2001,	   the	   financial	   crisis	  
reached	   a	   critical	   point	   with	   the	  
confrontation	   of	   the	   President,	   Ahmet	  
Necdet	   Sezer	   and	   the	   Prime	   Minister,	  
Bülent	   Ecevit,	   leading	   to	   a	   political	   crisis	  
that	   further	   deepened	   the	   financial	  
turmoil.	   The	   consequences	   of	   the	   crisis	  
were	  severe	  for	  the	  Turkish	  economy:	  The	  
GDP	   declined	   by	   9.5%	   in	   2001.	   The	  
unemployment	   rate	   increased	   by	   4%	  
during	  the	  same	  year.	  





































Despite	   its	   challenges,	   the	   post-­‐crisis	  
period	   in	   Turkey	   has	   been	   a	   great	  
incentive	   to	   overcome	   its	   long	   dated	  
structural,	   operational	  
and	  financial	  problems.	  In	  
fact,	   the	   growth	   rate	   of	  
the	   Turkish	   economy	  
between	   2002	   and	   2007	  
was	  at	  an	  average	  rate	  of	  
6.8%	   annually.	   Although	  
the	   growth	   slowed	  down	  
in	   2008	   and	   2009	  due	   to	  
the	   effects	   of	   the	   global	  
financial	   crises,	   the	   2010	  
annual	   growth	   rate	  was	   8.9%,	   one	   of	   the	  
fastest	  among	  the	  OECD	  countries.	  	  
Less	   than	   a	   decade	   later	   -­‐	   while	   Turkey	  
was	   enjoying	   a	   boom	   in	   its	   economy	   -­‐	   a	  
similar	  crisis	  story,	   this	   time,	  happened	   in	  
Greece	  in	  early	  2010.	  The	  massive	  revision	  
of	  the	  2009	  Greek	  budget	  deficit	  from	  “6-­‐
8%”	   to	  15.4%	  of	  GDP,	   in	   the	  midst	  of	   the	  
global	   financial	   turmoil,	   revealed	   the	  
vulnerabilities	   of	   the	   Greek	   economy,	  
decreasing	   the	   credibility	   of	   its	  
government	   bonds.	   The	   interest	   rates	   for	  
the	   two-­‐year	   Greek	   government	   bonds	  
were	  four	  times	  higher	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  
2011,	   in	   compared	   to	   one	   year	   ago.	   Its	  
economy	   shrank	   by	   4.5	   percent	   in	   2010,	  
and	   is	   expected	   to	   shrink	   by	   further	   3	  
percent	   within	   2011.	   Since	   May	   2010,	  
after	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   austerity	  
measures,	   there	   have	   been	   widespread	  
protests	   all	   around	  Greece,	  damaging	   the	  
social	   consensus	   for	   a	   reform	  period	   that	  
would	   be	   similar	   to	   Turkey’s	   after	   its	  
2000/1	  crisis.	  
In	   this	   brief,	   I	   will	   compare	   Turkey’s	  
2000/1	   Banking	   Crisis	   with	   the	   current	  
Greek	  crisis,	  referring	  its	  post-­‐crisis	  reform	  
experiences	  as	  a	  case	  study	  for	  Greece.	  In	  
the	   first	   section,	   I	   will	   deal	   with	   Greece,	  
where	   I	   will	   first	   explain	   the	   populist	  
surrender	   of	   the	   Greek	   economy	   by	   the	  
Greek	   Statism	   after	   its	   transition	   to	  
democracy	   in	   1974,	   which	   led	   to	   the	  
current	   economic	   crisis	   in	   the	   country.	   I	  
will	  also	  reveal	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  sudden	  
confidence	   loss	   among	  
the	   investors	   in	   2009,	  
causing	   a	   huge	   credit	  
crunch	   by	   early	   2010.	   In	  
the	   second	   section,	   I	   will	  
deal	   with	   Turkey.	   After	  
discussing	   the	   libe-­‐
ralization	   path	   in	   the	  
Turkish	   economy	   in	   the	  
1980’s,	   I	   will	   talk	   about	  
the	   structural	   problems	  
that	   started	   appear	   in	   the	   1990’s.	   I	   will	  
explain	   how	   these	   structural	   problems	  
finally	   shattered	   in	   Turkey	   with	   the	  
collapse	   of	   a	   mid-­‐sized	   private	   bank,	  
Demirbank,	   which	   led	   to	   huge	   losses	   in	  
confidence	   among	   investors.	   The	   third	  
section	  will	  be	  about	  the	  reform	  period	  in	  
Turkey,	   where	   I	   will	   question	   the	  
applicability	   of	   similar	   reforms	   in	   Greece.	  
In	   the	   fourth	   section,	   I	   will	   conclude	   by	  
arguing	   that	   Turkey’s	   banking	   sector	  
reforms,	   which	   contributed	   to	   the	  
country’s	   economic	   growth	   following	   the	  
crisis,	   is	   also	   applicable	   for	   the	   re-­‐
structuring	   of	   the	   Greek	   finance	   –	   even	  
though	   the	  Greek	   recovery	  will	   not	   be	   as	  
quick	   as	   Turkey’s	   due	   its	   low	  
competitiveness	   figures,	   de-­‐industrialized	  
economic	   structure	   and	   its	   commitment	  
to	  the	  Eurozone.	  
	  
Greek	   economy	   after	   civilian	  
democracy	   and	   the	   European	  
Community	  (EC)	  membership	  
It	   sounds	   quite	   odd	   when	   one	   says	   that	  
the	   start	   of	   the	   Greece’s	   economic	  
downturn	   coincides	   to	   the	   period	   after	  
1974:	   the	   year	   of	   its	   transition	   from	  
military	   dictatorship	   to	   a	   civilian	  
democracy.	   This,	   in	   fact,	   implies	   that	  
As	  the	  previous	  
experiences	  would	  suggest	  
and	  the	  logics	  of	  
economics	  would	  confirm;	  
current	  account	  deficits	  –	  
sooner	  or	  later	  –	  lead	  to	  
financial	  crises.	  





































democracies	   are	   not	   always	   capable	   of	  
promising	   stability	   and	   prosperity,	   and	  
they	   also	   need	   to	   contain	   a	   taste	   of	  
populism	   for	   the	   sake	  of	   their	   legitimacy.	  
Though	   the	   real	   slowdown	   for	   the	   Greek	  
economic	   performance	   seems	   more	  
pronounced	   in	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	  
1980’s,	   with	   the	   country’s	   admission	   to	  
the	  European	  Community	  and	  the	  Socialist	  
PASOK’s	   control	   of	   the	   government,	   	   we	  
already	   see	   a	   trend	   for	   economic	  
populism,	   state	   interference	   and	  
protectionism	  starting	  with	  the	  mid	  1970’s	  
–	  the	  period	  of	  economic	  stagnation	  in	  the	  
Western	  world	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   First	  Oil	  
Crisis	  in	  1973.	  	  
Greek	  government’s	  main	  response	  to	  the	  
crises	   of	   the	   1970’s	   was	   to	   decrease	  
investment	  and,	  on	  contrary,	   increase	  the	  
private	   and	   public	  
consumption,	   which	   was	  
especially	   the	  case	   in	   the	  
1980’s.	   The	   public	  
consumption	   as	   part	   of	  
GDP	  doubles	  in	  the	  1973-­‐
1985	   period.	   This,	   not	  
only	   initiated	   Greece’s	  
chronic	   budget	   deficit	  
problem,	  but	  also	  created	  
a	  period	  of	  high	  inflation.	  
The	  average	  inflation	  rate	  
in	   the	   country	   between	   1974	   and	   1993	  
averaged	   about	   18.41	   percent,	   an	  
indicator	   of	   increasing	   consumption	   from	  
60.6	   percent	   of	   GDP	   in	   1973	   to	   76.78	  
percent	   in	   1992.	   (Costas,	   George,	   2011,	  
p.	  7)	  	  
One	   way	   to	   examine	   the	   Greek	   budget	  
deficit	   would	   be	   through	   its	   saving-­‐
investment	  ratios:	  During	  the	  1980’s,	  with	  
the	   influx	   of	   European	   capital	   to	   Greece	  
through	   its	   EC	   membership,	   we	   see	   a	  
secular	   decline	   in	   national	   saving,	   which	  
can	   be	   traced	   to	   a	   deterioration	   in	   the	  
public	  sector	  fiscal	  position,	  as	  the	  budget	  
balance	  changed	  from	  0.5	  percent	  of	  GDP	  
in	   1960-­‐73	   period	   to	   an	   average	   of	   -­‐13.6	  
percent	   in	   1985-­‐95	   period.	   (Bosworth,	  
Kollintzas,	   2011,	   p.12)	  On	   the	   investment	  
side;	  a	  substantial	  portion	  of	  the	   long-­‐run	  
variation	   is	   accounted	   for	   by	   residential	  
investment,	   and	   hence	   the	   change	   in	  
business	   investment	   is	   less	   than	  might	  be	  
anticipated	   even	   though	   there	   is	   such	   a	  
large	  change	  in	  the	  saving	  rate.	  	  
Fisher,	  according	  to	  his	  1993	  paper,	  argues	  
that	   the	   swing	   in	   Greece’s	   annual	   fiscal	  
balance	  by	  10	  percent	  of	  GDP	  might	  have	  
reduced	   the	   country’s	   rate	   of	   economic	  
growth	  by	   about	   two	  percent	   per	   year	   in	  
the	   1980’s.	   In	   fact,	   the	   late	   1970’s	   and	  
1980’s	   saw	   the	   emergence	  of	   strong	   cost	  
pressures	  together	  with	  the	  strengthening	  
of	   the	   labor’s	   bargaining	   situation,	  
controls	   on	   many	   prices	   and	   raised	   real	  
wages	   well	   excess	   of	  
productivity.	   The	   data	  
suggest	  that	  the	  return	  on	  
equity	   in	   Greek	   manu-­‐
facturing	   fell	   from	   an	  
average	   of	   6	   percent	   in	  
1976-­‐80	  to	  -­‐6.8	  percent	  in	  
1982-­‐86.	   (Eurostat,	   2011)	  
Additio-­‐nally,	   the	   Greek	  
economy	   was	   relatively	   a	  
closed	   economy	   in	   1981	  
when	   the	   country	   was	  
admitted	  to	  the	  EC	  and	  opened	  its	  borders	  
to	   the	   European	   free	   trade.	   This	   sudden	  
liberalization	   in	   the	   Greek	   economy	  
further	  worsened	  the	  competitive	  position	  
of	  the	  Greek	  industries	  and	  contributed	  to	  
a	   squeeze	   on	   profits	   of	   domestic	   firms,	  
which	  led	  to	  the	  de-­‐industrialization	  of	  the	  
country.	  In	  this	  regards,	  the	  Greek	  exports	  
declined	  from	  a	  peak	  of	  17	  percent	  of	  GDP	  
in	   1981	   to	   less	   than	   10	   percent	   in	   1997.	  
(Bosworth,	  Kalintzas,	  2011,	  p.	  18)	  
The	   de-­‐industrialization	   of	   the	   country	  
during	   this	   period	   created	   an	   increasing	  
dependence	   on	   imports,	   which	   gave	   way	  
to	   the	   current	   account	   deficits.	   The	  
It	  sounds	  quite	  odd	  when	  
one	  says	  that	  the	  start	  of	  
the	  Greece’s	  economic	  
downturn	  coincides	  to	  the	  
period	  after	  1974:	  the	  year	  
of	  its	  transition	  from	  
military	  dictatorship	  to	  a	  
civilian	  democracy.	  





































dependence	   on	   imports	   has	   been	  
especially	   the	   case	   for	   the	  manufacturing	  
sector.	   The	  2008	   figures	   indicate	   that	   the	  
manufacturing	  current	  account	  deficit	  was	  
about	   65	   billion	   Euros,	   in	   compared	   to	   a	  
surplus	   of	   15	   billion	   Euros	   in	   services	   –	  
mostly	  due	   to	   the	   successes	  of	   the	  Greek	  
maritime	   and	   tourism	   industries.	  
However,	   the	   reason	   for	   the	   long	   time	  
current	   account	  
deficits	   was	   not	   only	  
due	   to	   the	   dete-­‐
rioration	   of	   the	   trade	  
balance	   in	   goods	   and	  
services	  –	  although	  the	  
latter	   deteriorates	  
significantly	   in	   the	  
1980’s	   and	   the	   1990’s,	  
but	   also	   due	   to	   the	  
deterioration	   of	   the	  
balance	  of	   income	  as	  a	  
result	  of	   the	   increasing	  
interest	   payments.	  
Increasing	   amount	   of	  
transfer	   payments	   coming	   from	   the	   EU	   -­‐	  
under	   the	   Integrated	   Mediterranean	  
Program	   -­‐	  was	   the	  only	  main	   reason	   that	  
prevented	   the	   complete	   fall	   down	   of	   the	  
current	  account	  during	  this	  period.	  	  
Under	   the	   principles	   of	   economics,	   a	  
country	   that	   is	   persistently	   facing	   current	  
account	   deficits	   would	   de-­‐value	   its	  
currency	   to	   increase	   its	   competitiveness,	  
hence	   increase	   its	   exports,	   decrease	   its	  
imports	   and	   turn	   the	   current	   account	  
deficit	   into	   a	   surplus.	   This,	   however,	   has	  
not	   been	   the	   case	   for	   Greece	   as	   the	  
country	   adopted	   Euro	   as	   its	   national	  
currency	   in	   2001	   –	   as	   part	   of	   its	  
continuous	  effort	   for	   the	  Europeanization	  
of	   the	   Greek	   nation	   -­‐	   making	   the	   Greek	  
products	   even	   more	   expensive,	   its	  
industries	   even	   less	   competitive	   and	  
further	  decreasing	  its	  export	  levels.	  	  
	  
The	  Greek	  crisis	  	  
Although	  Greece	  had	  managed	  to	  improve	  
the	   “private	   standards	   of	   living”	   of	   its	  
citizens	   during	   the	   last	   three-­‐decades;	  
when	   the	   economic	   crisis	   hit	   the	   country	  
in	  2009,	  all	  the	  long-­‐time	  deficiencies	  of	  its	  
economy	  was	  unmasked,	  which	  concerned	  
the	   organization	   of	   its	   society,	   its	  
economics	   institutions,	  
or	   the	   provision	   of	   its	  
public	   goods.	   In	  
contrary	   to	   the	  
fundamental	   charac-­‐
teristics	   of	   the	   global	  
economic	   crises	   that	  
started	   to	   erupt	   in	  
2008,	   where	   the	  
solvency	   risk	   has	   been	  
transferred	   from	   the	  
private	   sector	   to	   the	  
public	  sector;	  in	  Greece,	  
it	   was	   the	   government	  
debt	   that	   has	   put	  
pressure	  on	  the	  banking	  system.	  With	  the	  
liquidity	   pool	   provided	   by	   the	   European	  
interbank	  market	  as	  well	  as	  the	  European	  
capital	   markets,	   the	   role	   of	   the	   Greek	  
commercial	   banks	   evolved	   as	   being	   the	  
intermediaries	  that	  financed	  the	  excessive	  
current	   account	   deficit	   of	   the	   past	   years,	  
as	   well	   as	   a	   significant	   part	   of	   the	   pubic	  
debt.	  	  
Nevertheless,	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  global	  
financial	   crisis	   in	   September	   2008	   started	  
to	   create	   liquidity	   problems	   among	   the	  
European	   lenders.	   During	   2009,	   the	  
liquidity	  provided	  by	  the	  European	  Central	  
Bank	  (ECB)	  was	  largely	  handed	  over	  to	  the	  
Greek	  government,	  which	  the	  government	  
responded	   by	   issuing	   10	   billion	   Euros	  
worth	   of	   government	   bonds.	   Though	   the	  
Greek	  banking	  system	  was	  able	  to	  pass	  the	  
year	   2009	   in	   a	   relatively	   healthy	   state,	  
2010	  brought	   increased	  challenges.	   In	  the	  
midst	   of	   the	   global	   financial	   crisis,	   the	  
In	  contrary	  to	  the	  
fundamental	  characteristics	  of	  
the	  global	  economic	  crises	  
that	  started	  to	  erupt	  in	  2008,	  
where	  the	  solvency	  risk	  has	  
been	  transferred	  from	  the	  
private	  sector	  to	  the	  public	  
sector;	  in	  Greece,	  it	  was	  the	  
government	  debt	  that	  has	  put	  
pressure	  on	  the	  banking	  
system.	  





































massive	   revision	   of	   the	   2009	   budget	  
deficit	   by	   the	   Socialist	   government	   from	  
“6-­‐8%”	   to	   15.4%	   and	   the	   increasing	   debt	  
levels	   (127%	   of	   GDP	   as	   of	   2009)	   greatly	  
decreased	   the	   creditworthiness	   of	   the	  
Greek	  government	  bonds.	  These	  concerns	  
were	   further	   exacerbated	   by	   the	  
demonstrable	   lack	  of	   political	  will	   to	   deal	  
with	  the	  twin	  issue	  of	  deteriorating	  public	  
finances	  and	  the	  reduced	  competitiveness	  
of	   the	   economy	   by	   the	   successive	   Greek	  
governments,	   which	   further	   complicated	  
the	   borrowing	   terms	   for	   the	   commercial	  
banks.	  Therefore,	  the	  interest	  rates	  for	  the	  
two-­‐year	   Greek	   government	   bonds	  
reached	   to	   the	   levels	   of	   26.65%	   in	   May	  
2011	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	   4.53%	   in	   May	  
2007.	  (Bloomberg,	  2011)	  	  
The	   commercial	   banks,	   as	   the	   “financial	  
intermediaries”	   are	   particular	   organiza-­‐
tions	   that	   redistribute	   capital	   from	   those	  
that	  have	  them	  to	  those	  that	  have	  wills	  for	  
entrepreneurial	   and	  productive	  means.	   In	  
Greece,	  during	  the	  last	  three	  decades,	  this	  
could	   happen	   only	   through	   a	   very	   thin	  
capital	   base	   as	   most	   of	   the	   funds	   were	  
transferred	   for	   the	   finance	   of	   the	   budget	  
deficits	   of	   the	   Greek	   state.	   This,	   in	   fact,	  
reveals	   that,	   in	   addition	   to	   the	  
quantitative	   amount	   of	   the	   Greek	   debt,	  
there	   is	   also	   a	   qualitative	   problem	   of	  
supervision	   as	   the	   debt	   is	   predominantly	  
in	   the	   hands	   of	   the	   Greek	   government,	  
rather	   than	   the	   small	   and	   medium	   sized	  
private	   businesses	   that	   could	   have	   more	  
innovative	   approaches	   to	   pay	   back	   the	  
debts.	   Moreover,	   the	   absence	   of	   an	  
entrepreneurial	   private	   sector	   suggests	  
that	  the	  Greek	  government	  would	  only	  be	  
able	   to	   collect	   fewer	   taxes,	   which	   would	  
further	  complicate	  the	  burden	  of	  the	  debt	  
re-­‐payment.	   With	   the	   decreasing	   availa-­‐
bility	   of	   capital,	   the	   already	   small	  
industrial	  production	  of	   the	   country	  went	  
down	  by	  8%	  between	  March	  2010-­‐March	  
2011	   period.	   The	   unemployment	  
increased	  from	  10.3%	  in	  2009	  to	  16.2%	  in	  
2011,	   which	   greatly	   damaged	   the	   social	  
consensus	  in	  the	  country	  that	  was	  built	  on	  
social	  values,	  welfare	  state,	  protectionism	  
and	   hence	   the	   Europeanization	   of	   the	  
nation.	  (Eurostat,	  2011)	  	  
On	   May	   1,	   2011,	   after	   the	   Greek	  
government	   could	   finally	   persuade	  
Germany	   that	   Greece	   would	   go	   under	  
austerity	   measures	   and	   reform	   its	  
institutional	   framework,	   IMF-­‐EU-­‐ECB	  
consortium	  decided	   to	   issue	   a	   110	   billion	  
Euros	  worth	  of	  emergency	  loan.	  However,	  
the	   ongoing	   massive	   protests	   in	   Athens	  
against	   the	   austerity	   measures	   increase	  
the	  concerns	  regarding	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  
reform	  movement	  in	  the	  country.	  	  
	  
The	   liberalization	   of	   the	   Turkish	  
finance	  in	  the	  1980’s	  
While	   the	   Greek	   economy	   entered	   the	  
1980’s	   with	   the	   ideas	   of	   democracy,	  
European	   Community,	   socialism,	   welfare	  
state,	   protectionism	   and	   labor	   rights,	  
Turks,	   on	   the	   other	   side	   of	   the	   Aegean	  
Sea,	   were	   following	   complete	   opposite	  
directions	  in	  many	  ways:	  First,	  Turkey	  was	  
facing	  a	  coup	  d’état	  in	  1980	  as	  opposed	  to	  
Greece’s	   move	   towards	   democracy	   and	  
the	  EC	  in	  1981,	  and,	  second,	  while	  Greece	  
was	   embracing	   the	   socialist	   and	   welfare	  
state	   values,	   Turkey	   was	   announcing	   its	  
economic	  program	  for	  liberalization	  under	  
Prime	  Minister	   Turgut	  Özal,	  moving	   away	  
from	   the	   Statism	   (Devletçilik)	   principle	   of	  
Kemalism.	  	  
Turkey	  can	  be	  characterized	  as	  a	  planned	  
economy	   prior	   to	   1980.	   State	   agencies	   -­‐	  
such	   as	   the	   State	   Planning	  Organization	   -­‐	  
have	  played	  a	  major	   role	   in	   the	   country's	  
economic	   decisions	   after	   the	   foundation	  
of	  the	  Republic	  in	  1923.	  The	  turning	  point	  
for	   the	   Turkish	   economy	   was	   the	   period	  





































following	   the	   1980	   coup	   d’état,	   as	   the	  
anti-­‐Communist	   generals	   believed	   that	   a	  
capitalist	   spirit	   could	   only	   be	   kept	   alive	  
with	  the	  development	  of	  an	  entrepreneur	  
middle-­‐class	  in	  the	  country.	  The	  Economic	  
Stabilization	   and	   Structural	   Adjustment	  
program	  announced	  in	  1980	  by	  the	  former	  
Prime	   Minister	   Turgut	  
Özal,	   largely	   known	   as	  
the	   January	   24th	  
Decisions,	   adopted	  
policies	   that	   gave	  
priority	   to	   economic	  
growth	   based	   on	  
export	  promotion.	  	  
The	   structural	   reforms,	  
such	  as	  eliminating	   the	  
control	   in	   interest	  
rates,	   to	   encourage	  
foreign	   investment	   in	  
the	   country,	   aimed	   at	   increasing	   both	  
deregulation	  and	  liberalization	  of	  financial	  
markets.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	  macroeconomic	  
situation	   in	   Turkey	   changed	   dramatically	  
with	   the	   implementation	  of	   this	  program.	  
It	   eliminated	   quantitative	   and	   price	  
controls	   and	   put	   emphasis	   on	   a	   free	  
market	   approach.	   The	   financial	   sector	  
reforms	   targeted	   increasing	  deposits	  with	  
the	  market-­‐oriented	  interest	  rates,	  as	  well	  
as	   improving	   distributional	   and	  
operational	   efficiency	   of	   the	   financial	  
system	   with	   the	   diversification	   of	   the	  
financial	   system,	   which	   was	   mainly	  
denominated	  by	  banks.	  	  
	  
Turkey’s	  lost	  decade	  in	  the	  1990’s	  
Despite	  the	  liberalization	  movement	  in	  the	  
economy	   in	   the	   1980’s,	   and	   high	   growth	  
rates	   together	   with	   that;	   the	   1990s	   are	  
still	   considered	   to	   be	   a	   lost	   decade	   for	  
Turkey.	  The	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  revealed	  
two	   emerging	   political	   problems	   for	   the	  
Republic:	   Political	   Islam	   and	   Kurdish	  
Nationalism.	   The	   rise	   of	   political	   Islam	  
instilled	  fear	  among	  the	  public	  of	  another	  
coup	  d’état	  by	  the	  Turkish	  military,	  which	  
was	   regarded	   as	   the	   vanguard	   of	   the	  
secular	  Kemalist	  ideology.	  The	  increasingly	  
violent	  expressions	  of	  Kurdish	  nationalism	  
increased	  the	  chances	  of	  a	  civil	  war	  in	  the	  
country,	   dividing	   the	  
society	   between	  
ethnic	  lines.	  	  
This	  political	  instability	  
in	   the	   country	  
pressured	  the	  Govern-­‐
ment	   to	   make	   short-­‐
sighted	   economic	  
policies	   in	   the	   1990s	  
that	   only	   served	   to	  
further	  exacerbate	  the	  
series	   of	   severe	   crises	  
in	   1990,	   1994,	   and	  
1999.	   (Kibritçioğlu,	   2005,	   p.	   143)	   The	  
political	   crisis	   in	   1990,	   triggered	   by	   the	  
Gulf	   War	   in	   the	   territory	   of	   Turkey’s	  
neighbor-­‐state	   Iraq,	   was	   followed	   by	   a	  
financial	  crisis	  in	  1994	  brought	  about	  by	  a	  
huge	   current	  account	  deficit.	   The	   country	  
was	   then	  hit	   by	   another	   financial	   crisis	   in	  
1999	   due	   to	   the	   triggering	   effects	   of	   the	  
1997-­‐1998	   Asian	   Crisis	   and	   the	   1998	  
Russian	  Crisis.	  	  	  
The	   short-­‐lived	   and	   weak	   governments‘	  
main	  policy	  action,	  in	  the	  hopes	  of	  cooling	  
down	   the	   instability	   in	   Turkey,	   was	   to	  
increase	   fiscal	   spending:	   an	   action	   that	  
Greece	  has	  also	  adopted	  since	  the	  1980’s.	  
While	   military	   expenditures	   were	  
increasing	   (to	   the	   level	   of	   5%	   of	   the	  
country’s	   GDP)	   due	   to	   the	   Turkish	  
military’s	   war	   against	   the	   Kurdish	  
rebellions	   in	   South-­‐Eastern	   Turkey,	  
successive	   governments	   also	   kept	  
subsidizing	   farmers	   and	   the	   inefficient	  
state	   enterprises.	   The	   dynamics	   of	   the	  
domestic	   debt,	   therefore,	   reached	   an	  
unsustainable	   level	   in	   the	   1990s	   as	   the	  
domestic	  debt	  to	  GDP	  ratio	  increased	  from	  
While	  the	  Greek	  economy	  
entered	  the	  1980’s	  with	  the	  
ideas	  of	  democracy,	  
European	  Community,	  
socialism,	  welfare	  state,	  
protectionism	  and	  labor	  rights,	  
Turks,	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  
Aegean	  Sea,	  were	  following	  
complete	  opposite	  directions	  in	  
many	  ways…	  





































6%	   in	   1990	   to	   42%	   in	   1999.	   (Özatay	   and	  
Sak,	   2002,	   p.	   12)	   The	   increasing	  
indebtedness	   of	   the	   Turkish	   state	   in	   this	  
period	  was	  financed	  by	  two	  unsustainable	  
approaches:	  	  
1)	   The	   most	   common	   approach	   was	   to	  
borrow	   from	   Turkey's	   private	   banks.	   The	  
private	   banks	   were	   borrowing	   from	  
European	   banks	   and	   local	   lenders	   (	   e.g.	  
REPOs)	   on	   a	   short	   term	   basis	   and	   later	  
lending	  to	  the	  Turkish	  government.	  	  
2)	   The	   other	   source	   of	   finance	   was	  
through	   the	   state	   banks.	   	   As	   they	   were	  
allowed	   to	   make	   “duty	   losses”,	   the	  
governments	  could	  borrow	  from	  the	  state	  
banks	  without	   any	   previously	   determined	  
limit	   and	   regulation.	   Therefore,	   through	  
the	   funds	   of	   the	   state	   banks,	   the	  
government	  was	  subsidizing	  the	  inefficient	  
state	   enterprises,	   or	   even	   buying	   the	  
excess	  crops	  of	  the	  Turkish	  farmers,	  which	  
caused	   the	   state	   banks	   to	   undergo	   big	  
financial	   losses	   each	   year.	   (Uludağ,	   2008,	  
p.	  64)	  
The	   evolution	   of	   the	   Turkish	   state	   and	  
private	   banks	   -­‐	   as	   the	   financiers	   of	   the	  
government	  budget	  deficits	   -­‐	   and	  not	   the	  
private	   businesses	   -­‐	   show	   similarities	   to	  
the	   Greek	   case.	   In	   both	   2001	   Turkish	  
Banking	  Crises	   and	  2010	  Greek	  Crisis,	   the	  
fundamental	   structural	   problem	   can	   be	  
seen	   as	   the	   decreasing	   availability	   of	   the	  
credit	  for	  the	  private	  sector,	  which	  caused	  
decreases	   in	   their	   respective	   investments	  
and	  the	  eruption	  of	  the	  persistent	  current	  
account	  deficits.	  Such	  deficits	  –	  sooner	  or	  
later	   –	   would	   lead	   to	   the	   crises,	   i.e.	   the	  
Nordic	   banking	   crises	   in	   the	   1990s,	   the	  
Mexican	   “Peso”	   crisis	   in	   1994,	   or	   the	  
collapse	  of	  the	  East	  Asian	  “tigers”	  in	  1997.	  	  
Though	   there	   were	   fundamental	  
similarities	   in	   Turkish	   and	   Greek	   finance	  
prior	   to	   their	   respective	   crises,	   the	  
eruption	   of	   the	   Turkish	   crisis	   has	   been	  
much	   faster	   –	   as	   the	   availability	   of	  
financial	   instruments	   were	   not	   as	  
generous	   as	   in	   case	   of	   the	   EU	   member	  
Greece,	  and	  hence	  the	  investor	  confidence	  
was	   much	   fragile	   to	   be	   lost.	   Below	   I	   will	  
focus	  on	  the	  story	  of	  the	  Turkish	  crisis	  in	  a	  
more	  detailed	  way.	  
	  
Turkey’s	   2000-­‐1	   Banking	   Crisis:	  
Facing	  the	  fundamentals	  
In	   early	   2000,	   the	   accumulating	   fiscal	  
problems	   in	   Turkey	   meant	   that	   radical	  
economic	   reforms	  were	   urgently	   needed.	  
Prime	  Minister	  Bülent	  Ecevit's	  government	  
prepared	   a	   comprehensive	   Disinflation	  
Program,	   backed	   up	   by	   the	   IMF	   and	   the	  
World	   Bank.	   The	   main	   pillars	   of	   the	  
program	  were;	  
1)	   a	   tight	   fiscal	   policy	   focusing	   on	   im-­‐
proving	  the	  primary	  surplus;	  
2)	   a	   speed-­‐up	   of	   the	   structural	   reforms	  
and	  privatization	  efforts;	  
3)	   an	   income	   policy	   geared	   to	   targeted	  
inflation	  and;	  
4)	  a	  pre-­‐announced	  exchange	  rate	  basket.	  	  
However,	   there	   were	   disputes	   and	  
frictions	  among	  the	  coalition	  parties	  about	  
the	   timing	  and	   the	  modeling	  of	   structural	  
reforms	   and	   privatization	   plans.	   The	  
disagreements	  delayed	  the	  reforms,	  which	  
affected	   the	   confidence	   in	   the	  
government	   both	   in	   Turkey	   and	   abroad.	  
While	   the	   government	   was	   not	   able	   to	  
implement	   the	   structural	   reforms,	   the	  
combined	  effects	  of	   a	  number	  of	   internal	  
and	  external	  factors	  such	  as	  the	  sharp	  rise	  
in	  oil	  prices,	  the	  deterioration	  of	  the	  Euro	  
against	   the	   Dollar,	   and	   limited	  
international	  capital	  inflows	  were	  creating	  
a	   huge	   current	   account	   deficit	   in	   Turkey.	  
The	   boost	   in	   demand	   for	   both	   domestic	  
and	   imported	  goods	  was	  a	  major	   internal	  





































factor	   that	   contributed	   to	   the	   rising	  
current	   account	   deficit.	   	   As	   interest	   rates	  
on	   government	   papers	   fell	   sharply	   after	  
the	   implementation	   of	   the	   Disinflation	  
Program,	  the	  banks	  started	  to	  channel	  the	  
excess	  sources	  to	  private	  firms.	  The	  rising	  
demand	   and	   inertia	   caused	   inflation	   to	  
remain	   higher	   than	   projected.	   These	  
developments	  resulted	  in	  the	  appreciation	  
of	  the	  Turkish	  Lira	  and	  the	  depreciation	  of	  
Turkish	  competitiveness	  in	  export	  sectors.	  
The	   current	   account	   deficit	   reached	   the	  
dangerous	   level	   of	   4.2%	   of	   GNP.	  
(Belgenet.com,	  2011)	  	  
The	   catalyst	   for	   this	   worst-­‐case	   scenario	  
was	   in	   October	   2000	  when	   Demirbank,	   a	  
medium	   sized	   bank	   with	   80%	   of	   its	  
portfolio	   constituted	   from	   government	  
papers,	  could	  not	  borrow	  in	  the	  overnight	  
market.	  This	  forced	  the	  bank	  to	  sell	  part	  of	  
its	   government	   securities	   portfolio.	  
Demirbank's	   action	   triggered	   the	   interest	  
rates	   to	   shoot	   up	   overnight	   to	   2000	  
percent,	  prompting	  international	  investors	  
to	   exit	   the	   market.	   (Derviş,	   2001a,	   p.	   8)	  
This	   caused	   a	   credit	   crunch	   in	   Turkey,	  
which	  was	   aggravated	   further	   by	   the	   fact	  
that	  the	  Central	  Bank	  was	  prevented	  from	  
injecting	  liquidity	  into	  the	  financial	  system	  
by	  its	  commitment	  to	  defend	  the	  currency	  
peg	   –	   being	   one	   of	   the	   pillars	   of	   the	  
Disinflation	  Program.	  	  
The	   Ravages	   of	   this	   crisis	   on	   the	   banking	  
system,	   especially	   on	   the	   state-­‐owned	  
banks,	   increased	   the	   vulnerability	   of	   the	  
entire	   banking	   system.	   As	   a	   result	   of	  
Demirbank’s	   response	   and	   consequent	  
events	   in	   October	   and	   November	   2000,	  
the	   foreign	   investors	   had	   lost	   their	  
confidence	   in	  Turkey.	  The	  final	  straw	  that	  
brought	   about	   the	   collapse	   was	   the	  
confrontation	   between	   Prime	   Minister	  
Bülent	  Ecevit	  and	  President	  Ahmet	  Necdet	  
Sezer	   at	   the	   National	   Security	   Council	  
meeting	   on	   February	   19,	   2001.	   (Özutku,	  
2003,	   p.	   9)	   The	   two	   statesmen	   could	   not	  
agree	   on	   a	   common	   rescue	   package.	  
Prime	   Minister	   Bülent	   Ecevit,	   during	   his	  
press	  conference	  after	  the	  meeting,	  made	  
it	   public	   that	   the	   President	   used	  
inappropriate	  words	  against	  him,	  which	  he	  
said	   to	   be	   “against	   the	   state	   tradition	   of	  
Turkey.”	   The	   rumors	   suggested	   that	   the	  
President	   threw	   the	   Constitution	   Book	   at	  
Prime	  Minister	  Ecevit’s	  face.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  
this	  political	   crisis,	   the	  market	   confidence	  
was	  completely	  lost.	  The	  Turkish	  Lira	  once	  
more	  faced	  a	  currency	  attack	  on	  the	  same	  
day.	   The	   banking	   sector	   had	   to	   purchase	  
$7.6	   billion	   from	   the	   Central	   Bank	   to	   be	  
settled	  the	  next	  day.	  (Derviş,	  2001b,	  p.	  4)	  	  
As	   the	   reserves	   of	   the	   Turkey’s	   Central	  
Bank	   were	   eroding,	   the	   concerns	   that	  
were	  raised	  about	  the	  sustainability	  of	  the	  
currency	   peg	   system	   had	   further	  
deepened	   the	   lack	   of	   confidence.	   On	  
February	   21,	   2001,	   overnight	   repo	   rates	  
hit	   3000%	   levels.	   Istanbul’s	   Stock	  
Exchange	  index	  recorded	  its	  biggest	  fall	  of	  
18.11%.	   The	   government	   had	   no	   choice	  
but	   to	   float	   the	   Turkish	   currency	   on	  
February	  22,	  2001.	  After	  this	  decision,	  the	  
Turkish	  Lira	  depreciated	  by	  44%.	   (Özutku,	  
2003,	  p.	  10)	  
	  
Lessons	   from	   the	   Turkish	   reform	  
period:	  Is	  it	  applicable	  for	  Greece?	  
Despite	  all	  these	  developments,	  during	  his	  
press	  conference	  on	  April	  15,	  2001,	  Kemal	  
Derviş,	   the	   newly	   appointed	   Economy	  
Minister,	   described	   Turkey	   as	   the	   right	  
country	   to	   invest,	   saying	   that	   the	   foreign	  
investors	   in	  Turkey	  would	  definitely	  make	  
huge	   profits	   in	   the	   near	   future.	   Turkey’s	  
2000-­‐2001	  banking	  crisis	  has	  been	  a	  great	  
incentive	  for	  the	  country	  to	  reform	  its	  long	  
time	   structural,	   financial	   and	   operational	  
problems.	   	   Mr.	   Derviş	   introduced	   a	   new	  
economic	   program	  on	  May	   15,	   2001,	   top	  
priority	   of	   which	   was	   given	   to	   banking	  





































reform,	   followed	   by	   privatization.	   In	   this	  
part	  of	  the	  paper,	  I	  will	  analyze	  the	  reform	  
period	   in	   Turkey	   during	   the	   post-­‐crisis	  
period	  and	  will	  question	  their	  implications	  
in	  the	  case	  of	  Greece:	  
§ Depreciation	  of	  the	  currency	  
As	   part	   of	   the	   Disinflation	   Program	  
introduced	   in	   early	   2000	   and	   backed	   by	  
IMF	   and	   the	   World	   Bank,	   Turkey	   has	  
adopted	   a	   crawling	   peg,	  which	   the	   policy	  
makers	   aimed	   at	   sustaining	   the	   stability	  
through	   the	   exchange	   rate.	  However,	   the	  
rise	  in	  current	  account	  deficit	  –	  due	  to	  the	  
reasons	   that	  was	   previously	  mentioned	   –	  
was	   challenging	   the	   sustainability	   of	   the	  
peg.	   Since	   November	   2000,	   Turkish	   Lira	  
faced	  multiple	  currency	  attacks,	  which	  the	  
Central	   Bank	   could	   only	  
protect	   the	   peg	   after	  
injecting	   a	   7.6	  billion	  dollar	  
IMF	   loan	   to	   the	   economy.	  
However,	  when	  the	  Turkish	  
Lira	   was	   attacked	   by	  
another	   currency	   attack	  
after	   the	   political	   crisis	  
between	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  
and	   the	   President,	   the	  
reserves	   of	   the	   Central	  
Bank	  has	  already	  eroded.	  The	  government	  
had	   no	   choice	   other	   than	   floating	   the	  
currency	   on	   February	   22,	   2001.	   The	  
Turkish	  Lira	  depreciated	  by	  44%	  after	   this	  
decision	  –	  an	  action	  that	  greatly	  increased	  
the	  Turkish	  competitiveness.	  
Had	  Greece	  not	  acceded	  to	  the	  euro-­‐zone,	  
high	  external	   imbalances	  would	  sooner	  or	  
later	   have	   triggered	   a	   similar	   devaluation	  
of	   its	   currency.	   However,	   far	   from	  
depreciating,	   Greece’s	   real	   effective	  
exchange	   rate	   appreciated	   by	   17%	   over	  
the	   period	   2002-­‐2007,	   contributing	   to	   a	  
further	   exacerbation	   of	   its	   current	  
account.	  (Athanassiou,	  2009,	  p.	  366)	  With	  
Greece	  having	  the	  currency	  the	  Euro	  –	  and	  
as	   the	   Euro	   is	   not	   expected	   to	   fall	   down	  
anytime	   soon	   –	   the	   required	   real	  
depreciation	  can	  only	  come	  through	  price	  
deflation	   through	   lower	  production	   costs.	  
In	  this	  regard,	  there	  should	  be	  productivity	  
increases	   and	   wage	   decreases.	   Labor	  
markets	   reforms,	   service	   sector	   reforms	  
and	   pension	   reforms	   should	   be	  
implemented	  in	  order	  to	  support	  the	  price	  
deflation.	  
§ The	   re-­‐structuring	   of	   the	   state-­‐
owned	  banks	  
In	   Turkey,	   the	   financial	   structures	   of	   the	  
state-­‐owned	   banks	   had	   played	   an	  
important	   role	   in	   exacerbating	   the	  
financial	   crisis	   in	   2000	   and	   2001.	   Their	  
situation	   worsened	   during	   the	   crisis	   and	  
posed	   a	   threat	   to	   the	  
healthy	   functioning	   of	   the	  
banking	   system	   because	  
their	   high	   cash	   deficits	  
made	   these	   banks	   more	  
vulnerable	   to	   liquidity	   and	  
interest	   rate	   shocks.	  
Receivables	   arising	   from	  
the	   duty	   losses	  
represented	   the	   most	  
important	   reason	   for	   the	  
deterioration	  of	  the	  state-­‐owned	  banks.	  It	  
was	   stated	   in	   the	   Transition	   to	   a	   Strong	  
Economy	   program	   that	   the	   state	   banks	  
would	   no	   longer	   be	   forced	   to	   run	   duty	  
losses;	  any	  support	  provided	  via	  the	  state	  
banks	   was	   to	   be	   budgeted	   and	   not	  
allowed	   to	   lead	   to	   a	   loss.	   The	  new	  policy	  
also	   allowed	   the	   state-­‐banks	   to	   borrow	  
from	  the	  Central	  Bank,	  instead	  of	  from	  the	  
private	   investors	  with	   high	   interest	   rates,	  
which	   allowed	   them	   to	   meet	   the	  
regulatory	  capital	  adequacy	  ratios.	  On	  the	  
operational	   side,	   the	  management	   of	   the	  
two	   largest	   state	   banks,	   Ziraat	   Bank	  
(Agricultural	   Bank)	   and	   Halk	   Bank	  
(Commune	   Bank),	   were	   strengthened	  
through	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   common	  
Had	  Greece	  not	  acceded	  
to	  the	  euro-­‐zone,	  high	  
external	  imbalances	  
would	  sooner	  or	  later	  
have	  triggered	  a	  similar	  
devaluation	  of	  its	  
currency.	  





































and	   politically	   independent	   governing	  
board.	   (Uludağ,	   2008,	   p.	   67)	   The	  
management	   began	   to	   apply	   commercial	  
criteria	   to	   operations	   and	   pricing	   policies	  
that	  ensured	  profitability.	  
Similar	  to	  what	  happened	  in	  Turkey,	  Greek	  
state	   banks	   should	   also	   apply	   the	  
commercial	   criteria,	   instead	   of	   financing	  
the	   current	   account	   deficits	   of	   the	   Greek	  
state.	  Their	  boards	  should	  be	  composed	  of	  
professionals,	   who	   would	   not	   make	  
sacrifices	   under	   the	   political	   pressures.	  
Additionally,	  they	  should	  work	  closely	  with	  
their	   clients	   to	   avoid	   widespread	   loan	  
defaults.	  In	  the	  long	  run,	  the	  public	  sector	  
should	   also	   consider	   exiting	   the	   banking	  
system.	  
§ The	   banking	   regulation	   and	  
supervision	  agency	  
Before	  the	  eruption	  of	  the	  crisis	  in	  Turkey,	  
in	   August	   2001,	   the	   Turkish	   authorities	  
formed	   up	   the	   Banking	   Regulation	   and	  
Supervision	   Agency	   (BRSA)	   as	   an	  
independent	   body	   to	   regulate	   and	  
supervise	   the	   banking	   sector	   in	   the	  
country.	   This	   agency	   was	   also	   chosen	   to	  
be	  the	  main	  body	  for	  the	   implementation	  
of	  the	  banking	  reforms.	  After	  Kemal	  Derviş	  
became	  the	  Minister	  of	  State,	   the	  Turkish	  
government	   guaranteed	   the	  
independence	   of	   this	   body	   as	   its	   seven	  
members	   were	   not	   to	   be	   influenced	   by	  
politicians.	  	  
In	   Greece,	   after	   the	   government	  
announced	   that	   the	   country	  would	   adopt	  
tight	   fiscal	   and	   austerity	   measures,	   there	  
has	   been	   a	   widespread	   protest	   in	   the	  
country,	   which	   has	   limited	   the	   reform	  
initiatives	   of	   the	   politicians.	   An	  
independent	   body,	   similar	   to	   the	   BRSA	  
that	   would	   not	   make	   political	  
compromises	   during	   the	   reform	   period,	  
could	   be	   implemented	   to	   pursue	   the	  
reforms	  in	  the	  country.	  In	  this	  regard,	  any	  
assistance	   coming	   from	   the	   European	  
Union,	   International	   Monetary	   Fund	   and	  
the	  World	  Bank	  should	  be	  considered.	  	  
§ Ensuring	   that	  private	  banks	  have	  a	  
healthier	  structure	  
Turkey’s	  Saving	  and	  Deposit	  and	  Insurance	  
Fund	   (SDIF),	   following	   the	   crisis,	   handed	  
over	  some	  of	  the	  private	  banks,	  which	  has	  
transferred	   its	   resources	   to	   affiliated	  
companies	   beyond	   legal	   limits.	   Such	  
banks’	  debts	  had	  outstripped	  their	  capital	  
equalities.	   The	  private	  banks,	  which	  were	  
not	   taken	   over	   by	   SDIF,	   had	   also	   faced	  
significant	   losses	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	  
crisis.	   This	   led	   to	   a	   general	   loss	   of	  
confidence	   in	   the	   financial	   sector.	   SDIF's	  
primary	  goal,	  in	  order	  to	  regain	  the	  market	  
confidence,	  was	   to	  encourage	   the	  private	  
banks	   to	   increase	   their	   capital	   adequacy	  
ratios.	   BRSA	   believed	   that	   capital	  
assistance	   should	  have	  been	   available	   for	  
a	   limited	   period	   to	   all	   (commercial	   and	  
savings)	   banks	   that	   met	   the	   established	  
financial	   and	   operational	   criteria	   set	   by	  
the	   agency.	   The	   banks	   that	   were	   both	  
willing	   and	   able	   to	   meet	   the	   terms	   of	  
financial	  support	  would	  be	  able	  to	  receive	  
capital	   assistance	   from	   BRSA.	   This	   way,	  
they	   could	   attain	   a	   specified	   minimum	  
CAR	   and	   an	   adequate	   operational	  
structure.	  By	   the	  end	  of	  2001,	   the	  capital	  
assistance	   provided	   by	   the	   BRSA	   to	   the	  
private	   banks	   amounted	   to	   about	   1.4	  
quadrillion	   Turkish	   Lira	   ($1.1	   billion).	  
(BDDK,	  2008,	  p.	  32)	  Banks	  were	  also	  asked	  
to	  reduce	  their	  non-­‐financial	  participation	  
to	  further	  strengthen	  their	  structures.	  	  
Under	  the	  rescue	  package,	  the	  banks	  were	  
to	  use	  60%	  of	  government	  funding	  to	  save	  
financially	   ailing	   corporations.	   (BDDK,	  
2008,	   p.	   45)	   Companies	   that	   took	   out	  
large,	   short	   and	   medium	   term	   foreign	  
currency	   loans	   from	   the	   banks	   to	   make	  





































investments	   in	   2000	   and	   2001	   had	   seen	  
their	   debts	   multiply	   after	   the	   February	  
devaluation.	   Furthermore,	   under	   the	  
package,	  dubbed	  the	  "Istanbul	  approach",	  
the	  banks	  would	   restructure	   the	  debts	   of	  
many	   of	   the	   country's	   largest	   industrial	  
corporations	  that	  were	  in	  arrears	  on	  their	  
loan	  payments,	  over	   the	  next	   three	  years	  
(starting	   from	   2002).	   The	   program	   was	  
designed	   to	   get	   the	   real	   economy	   rolling	  
again	   after	  what	   came	   to	   be	   the	   nation's	  
worst	  recession	  since	  World	  War	  II.	  	  
Similarly,	   the	   crisis	   in	  Greece	   has	   put	   the	  
Greek	  private	  banks	  under	  strain.	  With	  the	  
decreasing	   availability	   of	  
funding,	   the	  private	  banks	  
are	   facing	   liquidity	  
problems.	   Some	   funds	  
were	   made	   available	  
through	   the	   European	  
Central	   Bank,	   yet	   they	  
would	   not	   be	   enough	   for	  
long-­‐term	   adequate	  
capital	   ratios.	   The	  
implementation	   of	   the	  
Financial	  Stability	  Fund	  	  -­‐	  a	  
capital	   support	   mechanism	   for	   the	   banks	  
that	   are	   not	   able	   to	   raise	   capital	   in	   the	  
private	  markets	  -­‐	  is	  an	  important	  initiative	  
in	   order	   to	   prevent	   any	   possible	   credit	  
crunch	   in	   the	   real	   sector	   that	   would	   be	  
more	  than	  necessary	  for	  the	  Greek	  private	  
sector	   to	   re-­‐born.	   The	   banks	   in	   Greece	  
should	  also	  increase	  their	  capital	  cushions,	  
ensuring	   that	   they	   have	   adequate	   capital	  
buffers,	   which	   would	   be	   a	   significant	  
initiative	   to	   regain	   the	   investor	  
confidence.	  	  
§ The	  globalization	  of	  the	  finance	  
The	  post-­‐crisis	  period	  saw	  a	  huge	  increase	  
in	   the	   number	   of	   international	   banks	   in	  
Turkey.	  HSBC,	  BNP	  Paribas,	  Unicredit,	   ING	  
Bank,	   Societe	   General,	   JP	   Morgan	   Chase	  
and	   Deutsche	   Bank	   were	   amongst	   the	  
most	   well-­‐known.	   Such	   international	  
banks,	  which	  used	  to	  lend	  to	  intermediary	  
banks	   in	   Turkey	   on	   a	   short-­‐term	   basis,	  
now	  opened	  their	  own	  branches	  in	  Turkey,	  
either	  by	  buying	  one	  of	  the	  bankrupt	  SDIF	  
banks	   (HSBC	   acquired	   Demirbank)	   or	   by	  
becoming	   partners	   with	   a	   local	   bank	  
(Citibank's	   20%	   stake	   in	   Akbank).	   Today	  
there	   are	   no	   more	   intermediary	   banks	  
between	   the	   real	   Turkish	   economy	   and	  
the	   international	   banks.	   International	  
banks	   are	   now	   directly	   responsible	   for	  
their	   lending	   decisions	   in	   Turkey.	   This	  
reduces	   the	   risk	   factor	   while	   allocating	  
credit	   to	   Turkey’s	   real	   economy.	   Turkish	  
businesses	   are	   now	   able	  
to	   borrow	   long-­‐term	  
credits	  with	  lower	  interest	  
rates.	  	  
In	   this	   regard,	   the	  
globalization	  of	   finance	   in	  
Greece	   might	   be	   an	  
important	   initiative	   for	  
financial	   stability	   as	   the	  
banks	   could	   seek	   further	  
capital	   and	   improve	  
markets’	   perceptions	   of	   their	   valuations.	  
As	   the	   banking	   sector	   consolidation	   is	  
necessary,	   “the	   entry	   of	   additional	   first-­‐
tier	  international	  banks	  as	  strong	  partners	  
would	  bolster	  the	  Greek	  banking	  system	  –	  
both	  for	  liquidity	  and	  capital.”	  (Traa,	  2011,	  
p.	  3)	  	  
§ Structural	  reforms	  of	  the	  1980s	  
Paul	  Krugman,	  following	  the	  Asian	  crisis	  in	  
1997	   and	   1998,	   had	   argued	   that	   the	  
investors	   could	  make	   huge	   returns	   in	   the	  
near	   future,	   if	   they	  chose	   to	   invest	   in	   the	  
Asian	   economies.	   Throughout	   the	   region,	  
assets	   were	   valued	   (in	   dollars)	   at	  
anywhere	   from	   25	   percent	   down	   to	   10	  
percent	   of	   what	   they	   were	   worth	   before	  
the	   crisis.	   (Krugman,	   1998,	   p.	   6)	   Asian	  
assets	   were	   much	   cheaper	   than	   it	   was	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supposed	   to	   be	   in	   1998.	   Less	   than	   four	  
years	   later,	   Kemal	   Derviş	  made	   the	   same	  
argument	   for	   the	   Turkish	   economy.	   As	  
Asian	  economies	  were	  not	  “paper	  tigers”,	  
in	   Krugman’s	   words,	   Turkey’s	   private	  
sector	   development,	   starting	   from	   the	  
early	   1980s,	   was	   also	   not	   a	   deception.	  
Therefore,	   there	   was	   huge	   potential	   for	  
growth,	   following	   the	   crisis	   period,	   once	  
the	   deficiencies	   of	   Turkey’s	   banking	  
system	  had	  been	  solved.	  
It	   is	   a	   doubt	   whether	   there	   is	   such	   a	  
potential	  for	  growth	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Greece,	  
following	   its	  crisis	  period.	  What	   is	  missing	  
in	   the	   Greek	   case	   is	   that	   a	   period	   of	  
industrialization,	  or	  a	  base	   for	  production	  
–	   no	  matter	   whether	   there	   is	   a	   boom	   or	  
bust	  cycle	  in	  the	  economy,	  would	  be	  there	  
for	   the	   recovery	   of	   the	   economy	   in	   the	  
post-­‐crisis	   period.	   	   With	   its	   commitment	  
to	   the	   Euro-­‐zone,	   low	   competitiveness	  
figures,	   state-­‐controlled	   industries,	   and	  
the	   absence	   of	   social	   consensus,	   it	   is	   not	  
clear	   whether	   Greece	   can	   adopt	   an	  
export-­‐led	   growth	   in	   its	   post-­‐crisis	   period	  
that	  would	   be	   similar	   to	   Turkey	   or	   South	  
Korea.	  Even	   if	   the	  country	  could	  establish	  
a	  consensus	  in	  this	  regard,	  its	  competitive	  
position	   would	   be	   much	   lower	   in	  
compared	   to	   the	   newly	   admitted	  
European	   Union	   (EU)	   members	   of	   the	  
Eastern	   Europe.	   Greece	   should	   urgently	  
start	  implementing	  its	  privatization	  plan	  in	  
order	   to	   boost	   the	   rise	   of	   an	  
entrepreneurial	  spirit	  in	  the	  country.	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  
On	  April	  2010,	  recently	  after	  the	  eruption	  
of	   the	   Greek	   crisis,	   an	   unexpected	   hand	  
from	   Turkey	   reached	   to	   Greece.	   Proud	  
with	   his	   country’s	   last-­‐decade	   growth	  
figures,	  Turkey’s	  then	  Vice	  Prime	  Minister,	  
Ali	  Babacan,	  paid	  a	  visit	  to	  Greece	  in	  order	  
to	  share	  his	  country’s	   reform	  period	  after	  
its	  2000/1	  crisis,	  arguing	  that	  it	  could	  also	  
be	  a	  case	  study	  for	  Greece.	  	  
In	  this	  brief,	  I	  analyzed	  the	  applicability	  of	  
the	  Turkish	  post-­‐crisis	  period	  for	  Greece.	  I	  
conclude	  with	  the	  following:	  
1) Persistent	   current	   account	   deficits	   in	  
Turkey	   and	   Greece	   resulted	   with	  
financial	   crises	   in	  different	  periods	  of	  
time.	  	  
2) The	   banking	   reforms	   in	   Turkey,	  
following	   the	   2000/1	   crisis,	   which	  
aimed	   at	   transparency,	   supervision,	  
regulation	   and	   the	   market	   rules	  
enabled	   the	   flow	   of	   the	   funds	   to	   the	  
small	   and	   medium	   sized	  
entrepreneurs	  who	  are	  considered	  as	  
the	   engines	   of	   growth.	   Within	   the	  
same	   perspective,	   the	   Greek	   finance	  
should	   also	   be	   taken	   out	   from	   the	  
populist	  rule	  of	  the	  Greek	  Statism	  and	  
should	  operate	   the	  under	   the	  market	  
principles.	  Independent	  bodies	  should	  
enforce	  supervision	  and	  regulation.	  	  
3) The	   de-­‐industrialization	   of	   Greece	  
since	   the	   1980’s,	   its	   low	  
competitiveness,	   its	   inability	   to	  
devalue	   the	   currency	   all	   complicates	  
the	   pace	   of	   the	   Greek	   recovery	  
through	  an	  export-­‐led	  or	   investment-­‐
led	  growth	  following	  the	  crisis.	  	  
4) In	   this	   regard,	   similar	   to	   Turkey’s	  
January	   the	   24th	   Decision	   adopted	   in	  
1980,	   Greece	   should	   pass	   through	   a	  
certain	  period	  of	  time	  that	  will	  change	  
the	  economic	  mentality	  in	  the	  country	  
from	   the	   dominance	   of	   the	   State	   to	  
the	  principles	  of	  market	  operations.	  	  
5) I	  argue	  that	  one	  important	  lesson	  that	  
Greece	   can	   learn	   from	   Turkey’s	   last	  
decade	   experience	   is	   the	   impacts	   of	  
the	   social	   consensus.	   One	   might	  
attribute	   the	   failure	   of	   Turkey’s	   2000	  
Disinflation	  Program	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  
such	   a	   consensus	   at	   the	   time.	   The	  





































success	  of	  2002	  Transition	  to	  a	  Strong	  
Economy	  can	  also	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  
establishment	   of	   consensus	   in	   this	  
regard.	  A	  strong	  consensus	  would	  also	  
convince	   the	   international	   credit	  
sources	  for	  better	  terms	  of	  lending.	  	  
Though	   it	   is	   not	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   this	  
brief,	  I	  also	  find	  it	  a	  duty	  to	  say	  a	  word	  on	  
recent	   debate	   regarding	   Turkey’s	  
overheating	   economy,	   increasing	   current	  
account	   deficits,	   sustainability	   of	   its	   post-­‐
crisis	   high	   growth	   figures	   and	   their	  
prospects	   for	   a	   new	   crisis:	   As	   this	   brief	  
argued,	   the	   currency	   depreciations	   serve	  
as	   a	   “thermostat”	   for	   the	   overheating	  
economies	   that	   face	   large	   amounts	   of	  
current	   account	   deficits.	   High	   interest	  
rates	   since	   2003,	  which	  made	   the	   capital	  
inflows	  available	  to	  Turkey,	  have	  kept	  the	  
Turkish	   Lira	   overvalued	   for	   a	   long	   time.	  
Despite	   the	   high	   growth	   figures,	   this	   has	  
led	  to	  an	  economy	  that	  was	  dependent	  on	  
imports	   and	   domestic	   demand	   for	  
sustainable	   growth.	   In	   parallel	   to	   the	  
recent	   depreciation	   in	   Turkish	   Lira,	   the	  
unsustainable	   increase	   in	   current	  account	  
deficits	   can	   only	   be	   overcome	   by	   new	  
exchange	   rate	   equilibrium.	   The	  
adjustment	  should	  extend	  into	  a	  period	  of	  
time,	  as	  a	  sudden	  adjustment	  would	  mean	  
crisis.	   	   While	   decreasing	   the	   growth	  
figures,	   an	   overtime	   deprecation	   of	   the	  
currency	   would	   lead	   to	   an	   increase	   in	  
exports,	   a	  decrease	   in	   imports	   and	  hence	  
an	  adjustment	  in	  the	  current	  account.	  The	  
policymakers	   should	   beware	   of	   the	  
statements	   that	  would	  break	   the	   investor	  
confidence.	   Any	   signal	   of	   mistrust	   to	   the	  
economy	   –	   especially	   the	   ones	   coming	  
from	   the	   policymakers	   –	   could	   lead	   to	  
sudden	  outflows.	  I	  will	  further	  discuss	  the	  
prospects	  of	  sustainable	  growth	   in	  Turkey	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